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CONTRACTS -

RECENT DECISIONS

CONSIDERATION -

MORAL OBLIGATION AS SUFFICIENT

FOR EXECUTION OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE IN PAYMENT OF DEBT BALANCE

Plaintiffs contracted to buy land from the defendant and later defaulted on the contract. After accepting the bonds of the

VOLUNTARILY DISCHARGED -
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Home Owners Loan Corporation in full satisfaction of the amount remaining
unpaid under the contract, the defendant conveyed by warranty deed to the
plaintiffs. The defendants signed a release form suplied by the H. 0. L. C. in
which they relinquished all claims against the plaintiffs and agreed not to require of the plaintiffs any second mortgage or other instrument or payment in
money to cover any portion of the original contract price. But as between the
plaintiffs and defendant, before the defendant agreed to take the bonds in full
satisfaction of the debt, it was underst<;>od that plaintiff would pay defendant
the difference btween the proceeds of the bonds and the contract price if there
should be a deficit. After the sale of the bonds there was a deficit of $450.
Plaintiffs delivered a promissory note for this amount to the defendant and
executed a mortgage on the property to the defendant. Plaintiffs now bring this
action to cancel and set aside the note and mortgage alleging that the agreement
was without consideration. Held, for the defendant on the ground that there
was a moral obligation owing from plaintiffs to defendant sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of consideration. Krause v. Swanson, (Neb. 1942), 3 N. W.

(2d) 407.1
The court in the principal case relies strongly upon the decision in Fourth
National Bank of Cadiz v. Craig,2 and cites with approval the sweeping assertion made in that case that a moral obligation to pay a pre-existing legal debt is
good consideration for the execution of a note and mortgage in payment thereof.
This doctrine was long ago asserted by Lord Mansfield. 3 However, the weight
of authority 4 for the last hundred and fifty years has refused to enforce subsequent promises of a debtor to pay all or part of a previously voluntarily discharged debt. 5 Thus moral obligation as a quid pro quo has practically dis1 The court also considered an allegation by the plainfrff's that the note and second
mortgage were void because contrary to H. 0. L .C. regulations, but found no merit in
the allegation. 3 N. W. (2d) 407 at 410.
2 I Neb. (Unof.) 849, 96 N. W. 185 (1901). In this case the maker of a note
defaulted and the surety made good, receiving back the note marked "paid." The surety
assigned the note and right to collect from the maker to a bank. The maker resisted suit
by the bank on the ground of no consideration at the time of transfer, for the note had
been discharged. The court decided that the fact that appellant honestly owed the
debt and was morally obligated to pay it was a sufficient consideration for the execution
of a note and mortgage.
3 "About the middle of the eighteenth century the term 'moral obligation' as a
kind of past consideration giving validity to a subsequent promise to fulfill the obligation
gained currency. This seems to have been due to the influence of Lord Mansfield. He
was trained in the doctrine of the civil law and undoubtedly disliked the common-law
doctrine of technical consideration." I WtLLisToN, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 147 (1936).
"'l WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed.,§ 159 (1936); ANSON, CoNTRACTS, 5th Am.
ed., 136 et seq. (1930); I PAGE, CoNTRACTS, 2d ed.,§ 632 (1920).
5 Rasmussen v. State National Bank, II Colo. 301, 18 P. 28 (1888), found no
consideration for a promise to pay the balance remaining on claims after a'
composition agreement. The court emphasized the point that after a voluntary accord
and satisfaction had extinguished a claim, there was nothing left to form a consideration
to pay any portion of the claim so extinguished. Accord: Ingersoll v. Martin, 58 Md.
67 (1882); Hale v. Rice, 124 Mass. 292 (1878); Mason v. Campbell, 27 Minn. 54,
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appeared from the law save for a few well-recognized exceptions.6 The instant
case offers a fact situation not covered by any of these exceptions, for here the
debt was voluntarily released and the creditor accepted a smaller sum from
a third party in full extinguishment of the debtor's obligation. However, statutory enactments in a few states, 7 and a number of decided cases 8 appear to
hold moral obligation in general to be sufficient. Since no legal obligation remained when the defendant accepted the H. 0. L. C. bonds after previous signing of the release agreement,11 the principal decision seems to fall in line with
6 N. W. 405 (1880); Grant v. Porter, 63 N. H. 229 (1884), distinguishing between
the effect of a voluntary discharge (no consideration for new promise) and a discharge
in bankruptcy (new promise thereafter is enforceable); Gross, Kelly & Co. v. Bibo,
19 N. M. 495, 145 P. 480 (1914).
6 Among these exceptions are where a pre-existing legal debt is barred by some
technical rule of law: Born v. La Fayette Auto Co., 196 Ind. 399, 145 N. E. 833
( 1924), moral obligation to pay debt honestly owing, but uncollectible because of operation of rule of law taking away the remedy, held to be sufficient consideration for the
execution of a note to secure it; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Beatty, (C. C. A.
9th, 1899) 93 F. 747, debt discharged by bankruptcy; Baker v. Gregory, 28 Ala. 544
( 18 56), new promise after attainment of majority; Marshall v. Holmes, 68 Wis. 555,
32 N. W. 685 (1887), bar of statute of limitations; Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash. 131,
104 P. 153 (1909), bar of statute of frauds; cases collected in 17 A. L. R. 1299 at
1328 (1922); 79 A. L. R. 1346 at 1350 (1932); 53 L. R. A. 353 at 362 (1901);
26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 520 at 522 (1910); 16 M1NN. L. REv. 808 t1932); 1 W1LL1sTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§§ 148, 150, 155, 157, 158 (1936).
7 Ga. Code Ann. (1935), § 20-303: "A good consideration is such as is founded
on ••• a strong moral obligation." Natural obligations are declared to be sufficient consideration for a new contract by La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1932), §§ 1758, 1759. In re
Atkins' Estate, (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 761, interpreting this statute, held that
a natural obligation was a purely moral obligation not based on any prior legal obligation. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1939), § 1606: "a moral obligation originating in
some benefit conferred upon the promisor, or prejudice suffered by the -i,romisee ••• is
••• good consideration for a promise••••" See, In re McConnell's Estate, 6 Cal.
(2d) 493, 58 P. (2d) 639 (1936), where the code provision was construed to be applicable only where good and valuable consideration had once existed. See also 36
M1cH. L. REv. 1010 (1938).
8 Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628 at 635, 238 N. W. 516 (1931),
stating, "he ought in morals to do what he knowingly and advisedly gave one acting for
his own benefit and to his own hurt to understand he would do"; Estate of Smith,
226 Wis. 556, 2i7 N. W. 141 (1938); Estate of Schoenkerman, 236 Wis. 3u, 294
N. W. 810 ( 1940), noted 39 M1cH. L. REv. 1025 ( 1941); Fourth National Bank of
Cadiz v. Craig, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 849, 96 N. W. 185 (1901). See also Muir v. Kane,
55 Wash. 131, 104 P. 153 (1909), holding-broker's services sufficient moral obligation to constitute consideration. See also cases collected in FoURTH DECENNIAL
D1cEST,."Contracts," § 76 (1937).
9 Payment of a less sum by a third person's note or obligation and acceptance
thereof by the creditor is an extinguishment of the entire debt. Wipperman v. Hardy,
17 Ind. App. 142, 46 N. E. 587 (1897); Brooks v. White, 2 Met. (43 Mass.) 283
(1841); Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) II6 (1835); Conklin v. King, 10
N. Y. 440 (1853). In Stafford v. Bacon, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 532 (1841), where a creditor
accepted the commercial paper of a third person, expressly in satisfaction of the entire
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these cases and statutes. Although the language of the court goes far,10 the facts
themselves do not stand for a return to the idea that a pre-existing legal debt,
once discharged, is in. itself sufficient consideration. They are closely analogous
to those in the New York case of Taylor 'U. Hotchkiss,11 where an accord and
satisfaction was effected by substitution of securities at fixed valuation. That
c0urt limited its decision to situations where a moral obligation was recognized
at the time of the compromise, and was an inducement thereto. On its facts the
scope of the principal case seems to be limited to such situations.
DAMAGES -

AooITUR WITH No OPTION oF NEW TRIAL TO DEFENDANT

- Plaintiffs brought separate actions for personal injuries resulting from an
automobile collision. The aggregate damages assessed by the jury amounted to
$150. Upon motion,'the trial court raised this sum to $992.85, granting to the
plaintiffs alone the option of a new trial on the question of damages. Plaintiffs
accepted the sum fixed by the court. The defendant appealed on the ground that
he had been denied the right to trial by jury. Held, for the plaintiffs. In a very
brief opinion based upon the precedent of Risch 'lJ. Lawhead 1 the court found
that there was no denial of the right to jury trial whel]. a court raised inadequate damages to the lowest sum which a properly instructed jury would probably render, allowing no new trial option to the defendant. Tollander 'U. Bonne'Uille, 240 Wis. 500, 3 N. W. (2d) 679 (1942).
A grossly excessive or inadequate award of damages by the jury is traditionally a. basis for a new trial. Remittitur and, to a less extent, additur have
been developed as substitutes for new trials by most courts. 2 The use of either
c.f these methods, however, has ordinarily required the giving of an option of
standing new trial to the party benefited by the erroneous jury award.8 In giving
debt, it was held to be a good accord and satisfaction.. See cases cited in 41 A. L. R.
1490 at 1494 (1926); 2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 421 (1932) j 6 WILLISTON,
CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., §§ 1857, 1860 (1936).
10 The court states in the principal case, 3 N. W. (2d) at 408, that a moral obligation to pay a pre-existing legal debt is good consideration for the execution of a
note and mortgage in its payment.
11 81 App. Div. 470, 80 N. Y. S. 1042 (1903), affirmed in 179 N. Y. 546, 71
N. E. II40 (1904). In this case, a corporation persuaded its creditors to accept certain
securities in an attempt to settle their full claim, and further proposed to offer its moral
obligation to take the securities back at a fixed valuation of 80 per cent. See also
Park Fal!s State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N. W. 516 (1931), where the
promisee did not discharge the debtor. until given assurance that the debtor would
make up the deficit.
1 2II Wis. 270, 248 N. W. 127 {"1933). There the jury had assessed the damages
at $3,000 for personal injuries and the trial court increased them to $4,000, and ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff desired to take the $4,000 as the smallest judgmen.t an "unprejudiced jury would award."
2 For evidence of the modern trend towards a full use of both additur and remittitar, see 44 YALE L. J. 318 U934).
8 The courts reason. that it is otherwise a denial of the right of trial by jury: Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 9 S. Ct. 696 (1889); Sigol v. Kaplan, 147 Wash. ~69,
266 P. 154 (1928); Crawford v. Emerson Const. Co., 222 Iowa 378, 269 N."W.
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only the plaintiffs, the parties prejudiced by the jury's award, this option, the
court in the instant case has made an important modification of customary procedure. Clearly there has been a marked departure from the right to jury trial,
at least in its customary form. This matter the court does not deal with, being
of the opinion that it was settled by Risch v. Lawhead. 4 In so doing it ignores
a later opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court II which stated
that both parties had to be given an option in additur cases, for otherwise the
c0urt would be making a "bald addition of something which in no sense can
be said to be included in the verdict." It may be argued that since the judge is
governed in his action by the minimum award of a properly instructed jury 6
and that since there is no radical difference between this process and the directing of verdicts upon the evidence, 7 no substantial advantage of jury trial has
334 (1936); Lonclon & Scottish Assur. Corp. of London, England v. Smith, 229 Ala.
556, 158 So. 892 (1935); S. & C. Transport Co. v. Barnes, 191 Ark. 205, 85 S. W.
(2d) 721 ( 1935); Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 280, I 10 P. (2d) 723
(1941). Also, see annotations: 53 A. L. R. 779 (1928); 95 A. L. R. II63 (1935).
In Watt v. Watt, [1905] App. Cas. II5, a remittitur case, the court required both the
plaintiff and defendant to consent to a reduction of verdict by the court as a substitute for jury trial. Of course, with liquidated damages the courts have had little difficulty with options, but allow the entry of an absolute decree since any correction is
merely a matter of computation. A few courts on occasion have ignored the matter of
opt:ons, in case of unliquidated damages, and merely entered an absolute increase or
decrease of the damages. Thus, in Bass v. Peterson, 168 Va. 273, 191 S. E. 519 (1937),
the court said that the trial court may enter the amount of damages for personal
injuries when what the jury found is inadequate and there is no conflicting evidence as
to the extent of the injuries. Also, Gable v. Bingler, 177 Va. 641, 15 S. E. {2d) 33
(1941); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Noles, 201 Ark. 1088, 148 S. W. (2d) 650
(1941); Southall v. Smith, 151 La. 967, 92 So. 402 (1922).
4 See note 1, supra.
5 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 at 486, 55 S. Ct. 296 (1935). The majority
opinion distinguished remittur and additur. It was felt that in the former case the
verdict, even though reduced by the court, still originated from the jury while in the
latter case the court by itself manufactured at least a portion of the verdict. This distinction is criticized in 20 CoRN. L. Q. 342 (1935). To the effect that the defendant
alone should have the option in additur cases and not both parties, see 3 2 M1cH. L.
REv. 538 (1934).
The decision of the United States Supreme Court was not binding upon Wisconsin, since state courts are not controlled by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1876); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S.
294 {1877). At the same time it might very well have had a persuasive effect on the
court in the instant case in interpreting Article 1, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution
guaranteeing the right to jury trial in cases at law unless waived by the parties.
6 This reasoning was employed in Risch v. Lawhead.
1 " • • • a directed verdict is proper when it is plain that a contrary verdict cannot
be allowed to stand .•••" 31 AM. Ju&. 561 (1940). A directed verdict does not deny
the right of trial by jury. 35 C. J. 241-242 (1924). Also, see 17 TENN. L. REv.
250 (1942).
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been denied. 8 Such arguments appear somewhat strained, however.9 In spite
of its shortcomings, the decision has its practical advantages in a facilitating of the
judicial process. 10 The pr~ctice of the Wisconsin court will doubtless become
more common and will quite likely be further developed.11

8 " • • • it should not be taken as indicating a tendency to invade or narrow the
functions of the jury, but rather as indicating that our jurisprudence is still developing
toward that ideal of perfection where the administration of the law is truly the administration of justice," Baxter v. ~hicago & N. W. Ry., 104 Wis. 307 at 336, So
N. W. 644 (1899), and cited in Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N. W.
374 (1927).
'
9 An undeniable element of discretion is left in the trial judge, for, especially in
the field of torts, the standards for the measurement of damages are far from fixed.
See McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, § 6 (1935). ·
10 "The consequence [ of awarding new ·trials] has been to prolong litigation, to
swell bills of cost, to delay final adjudication, and, in a large number of instances, to
have such excessive judgments repeated over and over, upon the new trial.'' Alabama
Great Southern R.R. v. Roberts, 113 Tenn. 488 at 493, 82 S. W. 314 (1904).
11 lf the view of Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296 (1935), is not
followed, and there is good authority for not following it, it might not be necessary for
the Wisconsin court to give any option whatever. See Sunderland, "The Scope of
Judicial Review,'' 27 MICH. L. REv. 416 (1929), where the author states that in the
interest of decreasing cost and uncertainty, it even would be desirable to confer upon
trial and appellate courts the power to revise directly the award of damages.

